Patrolling is one of the central problems in operational security. Formally, a patrolling problem is specified by a set U of nodes (admissible defender's positions), a set T ⊆ U of vulnerable targets, an environment E ⊆ U × U (admissible defender's moves), and a function d which to every target u assigns the time d(u) ∈ N needed to complete an intrusion at u. The goal is to design an optimal strategy for a defender who is moving from node to node and aims at detecting possible intrusions at the targets. The defender can detect an intrusion at a target u only by visiting u before the intrusion is completed. The goal of the attacker is to maximize the probability of a successful attack, and the defender aims at the opposite. We assume that the attacker is adversarial, i.e., he knows the strategy of the defender and can observe her moves.
Introduction
A central problem in security and operational research is how to deploy limited security resources (such as police patrols, security guards, etc.) to maximize their effectiveness. Clearly, police patrols cannot be everywhere all the time, security guards cannot check every door every minute, etc., which raises a crucial question how to utilize them best. Game theoretic approaches to operational security problems based on Stackelberg model have received much attention in recent years (see, e.g., [24] ). Informally, the problem is to find the best possible strategy for a defender who is supervising potentially vulnerable targets (such as airports, banks, or patrol stations) and aims at detecting possible intrusions. The time needed to complete an intrusion at each target is finite, and the aim of the defender is to maximize the probability of discovering an intrusion before it is completed. An intensive research in this area has led to numerous successful applications (see, e.g., [21, 14] ). Due to high demand for practically usable solutions, the main emphasis has been put on inventing methods that can produce working solutions for large-scale instances quickly. In most cases, the problem is simplified (for example, by restricting the set of defender's strategies to some manageable subclass), and various tricks are used to avoid non-linear constraints and/or objectives. This approach enables efficient synthesis of strategies that are "good enough" for practical purposes (thus, the main engineering goal is achieved), but does not allow for synthesizing optimal or ε-strategies (for a given ε > 0) in general. Further, the size of the resulting mathematical program is usually proportional to the number of targets, which influences the scalability of these methods. Since developing the basic theory of the underlying game model has not received so much attention as designing practically usable solutions, many fundamental questions (such as the computability of the Strackelberg value, the existence and computability of an optimal/ε-optimal defender's strategy, etc.) are open or have even been answered incorrectly. In this paper, we provide a solution for some of these problems. As an unexpected payoff of our study, we also obtain a completely new approach to synthesizing defender's strategies in security games with fully connected environment based on compositional reasoning, which avoids the use of mathematical programming and can be applied to exponentially larger instances than the currently available methods. A detailed explanation of the achieved results is given below.
In this paper, we consider the adversarial variant of patrolling, where the attacker is assumed to be quite powerful-he can observe defender's moves, and he even knows defender's strategy. However, he cannot predict the way of resolving the defender's randomized choice. Formally, a patrolling problem G is specified by a finite set U of nodes (possible defender's positions), a set T ⊆ U of targets, an initial nodeû ∈ T (the initial position of the defender), an environment E ⊆ U × U (admissible moves of the defender) and a function d : T → N which to every target associates the corresponding attack length. The defender starts atû and then moves from node to node consistently with E. We assume that traversing every edge takes precisely one unit of time (longer moves can be modeled by inserting intermediate nodes.) The defender may choose the next node randomly and independently of her previous choices. Formally, a defender's strategy is a function σ : H → ∆(U) where H is the set of all finite non-empty sequences of nodes and ∆(U) is the set of all probability distributions over U. We require that σ is consistent with E, i.e., the support of σ(h) is a subset of nodes that are immediate successors of the last node of h. Note that each σ determines a unique probability space over all runs (infinite paths in (U, E)) initiated inû in the standard way, and we use P σ to denote the associated probability measure.
Depending on the observed walk of the defender, the attacker may choose to attack some target or wait (we assume that the attacker may attack at most once during a play). More precisely, an attacker's strategy is function π : H → T ∪ {⊥} such that whenever π(h) ⊥, then for all proper prefixes h ′ of h we have that π(h ′ ) = ⊥. Since the attacker has a complete knowledge about the current position of the defender, he would never attack a target currently visited by the defender. Still, he may attack this target immediately after the defender's departure, i.e., long before the defender arrives to the next node (think of an UAV patrolling military bases). This assumption is reflected in the definition of a discovered attack-if the current location of the defender is u and the attacker attacks a target v, the defender has to visit the node v within the next d(v) time units to discover this attack, even if u = v. The aim of the defender is to maximize the probability of successfully detected (or not initiated) attacks, while the attacker aims at the opposite. Given a strategy σ of the defender and a strategy π of the attacker, we use P σ (D [π] ) to denote the probability of all infinite paths w initiated inû such that either π(h) = ⊥ for every prefix h of w (i.e., no attack is encountered along w), or π(h) = v ∈ T for some prefix h of w and v is among the nodes visited after h in w in at most d(v) transitions (i.e., w contains a successfully defended attack). The value of σ is defined
, where π ranges over all strategies of the attacker. The Stackelberg value of G is defined by val = sup σ val(σ), where σ ranges over all strategies of the defender. A defender's strategy σ * is ε-optimal (where ε ≥ 0) if val(σ * ) ≥ val − ε. A 0-optimal strategy is called optimal. Two simple examples. To get some intuition about the patrolling problem, we start with two simple examples that will also be used to demonstrate some of our results. Let us first consider the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (left) . Here, we need to patrol three nodes with the same attack length 2 (i.e., T = U), where u 0 is the initial node, in a fully connected environment. Let us try to determine the Stackelberg value and an optimal strategy of the defender. A naive idea is to pick a strategy σ which always selects each of the three immediate successors with probability 1/3. Consider a strategy π of the attacker such that π(u 0 ) = u 2 . We have that P σ (D[π]) = 1/3 + 2/3 · 1/3 = 5/9, and one can easily verify that for every attacker's strategy π ′ we have that P σ (D[π ′ ]) ≥ 5/9. Hence, val ≥ val(σ) = 5/9. However, the defender can do better. Consider the strategy σ * defined in Fig. 1 (left) . Observe that σ * is independent of the currently visited node; the only relevant information about the history of a play is whether its length is even or odd. If it is even (odd), then σ * randomly selects between u 0 and u 2 (or between u 1 and u 2 ) where the ratio between the two probabilities is the golden ratio. One can check that for every defender's strategy π we have that
. In fact, the strategy σ * is optimal, i.e., val = ( √ 5 − 1)/2, which is perhaps unexpected (see also the paragraph "Comments on D" below). Now consider the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right) . Here we need to patrol five nodes (T = U); two of them have the attack length 2 and three of them have the attack length 3. Again, we assume a fully connected environment. If we examine a naive strategy σ which always selects the next node uniformly among all immediate successors, we obtain that val(σ) = 9/25. A better strategy σ * for the defender is shown in Fig. 1 (right) . The strategy σ * depends only on the length of the history modulo 6, and it always chooses uniformly between exactly two nodes. It directly follows from our subsequent contributions (namely C) that val = val(σ * ) = 1/2, i.e., σ * is optimal and the Stackelberg value is equal to 1/2. Our contribution. We start by proving the following results about the general patrolling problem:
A. For an arbitrary patrolling problem, there exists an optimal strategy for the defender. B. Given a patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d) and a rational ε > 0, there is a finite-memory ε-optimal strategy σ for the defender computable in time exponential in ||G|| and polynomial in ε −1 (here, ||G|| is the encoding size of G, where the attack lengths are encoded in unary). Further, val(σ) is rational and can also be computed in exponential time, i.e., we can also approximate val up to a given ε > 0 in exponential time. We also observe that val cannot be approximated up to the error smaller than |U| −1 in polynomial time unless P = NP.
Comments on A. The existence of optimal strategies for patrolling problems (and their variants) has been claimed in previous works (see, e.g., [6, 5] ) by arguing in the following way. For each j ∈ N, let Σ j be the class of all defender's strategies σ such that σ(h) depends only on the last j nodes of h. If we restrict the range of σ to the strategies of Σ j in the definition of Stackelberg value, we obtain an approximated value, denoted by val j . Obviously, val j+1 ≥ val j for every j ∈ N. By adapting the results of [13] , it has been shown in [5] that for every j ∈ N one can compute a strategy σ ∈ Σ j which achieves the outcome val j or better against every attacker's strategy. In [6, 5] , it has been also claimed that val = val j for some sufficiently large j (without providing any upper bound). The argument is based on applying general results about strategic-form games, but a full proof is omitted. Using the techniques of Section 2.5, we prove that this claim is incorrect, even for the simple patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right) where the defender has no optimal strategy in ∞ j=1 Σ j . In our proof of A, we take an infinite sequence of strategies σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . such that lim n→∞ val(σ n ) = val and "extract" and optimal strategy out of it.
Comments on B. Our exponential-time algorithm for constructing an ε-optimal strategy is based on combining two main ideas. First, we show that the Stackelberg value of a given game stays the same when the initial target is changed. This implies that small perturbations in probability distributions employed by an optimal strategy cause only a small change in the strategy value. Hence, we can compute a suitable discretization scale and safely restrict the range of considered strategies to the discretized probability distributions. Let d = max u∈U {d(u)}. The next important observation is that thed-step behaviour of every strategy (after some finite history) can be fully characterized by a real-valued vector with exponentially many components, where each component corresponds to a probability of visiting some vertex in at most k ≤d transitions. Due to the previous discretization step, we can safely restrict the range of these vectors to finitely (exponentially) many values. It follows that if there is some ε-optimal strategy, then there is also an ε-optimal strategy whosed-step behaviour (after every finite history) can be characterized by one of these exponentially many vectors, and we show how to check the existence of such a strategy in exponential time (this is perhaps the most difficult part of the argument).
The lower complexity bound is trivial. Given a patrolling problem with d(u) = |U| = k for all u ∈ U, we have that val = 1 iff the environment contains a directed cycle through all the nodes (i.e., it is a Hamiltonian digraph), which is NP-hard to decide. If the game is a negative instance, then for every strategy of the defender, the attacker clearly can launch an attack at the very beginning of a play with probability of success at least 1/k. From this we immediately obtain the second part of B. Although in recent [20] , it is shown that the problem whether val = 1 for a given patrolling problem is PSPACE-complete, the construction of [20] only (for principal reasons) rules out, unless P = PSPACE, the existence of an ε-optimal strategy for the defender with ε ≤ c · exp (−|U|) for some c > 0.
Since solving general patrolling problems is computationally hard, we continue our study by restricting ourselves to fully connected environments, where E = U×U. Observe that the defender has no reason to visit non-target nodes in fully connected environments, and hence we can further safely assume that T = U. For example, think of a surveillance system equipped with several cameras installed in front of various doors, where the footage of the cameras is shown in turns on a single screen (for some small constant amount of time) watched by a human guard. The time needed to break (open and close) different doors can be different. Then, the nodes/targets of the associated patrolling problem correspond to the cameras, the environment is fully connected (assuming one can switch between the cameras freely), and the transition time between two nodes is the same (and it can be normalized to 1). Under these assumptions, a patrolling problem is fully specified by its signature, i.e., a function S : N → N 0 which for a given k ∈ N returns the number of all u ∈ T with d(u) = k. An important subclass of signatures are well-formed signatures, where k divides S (k) for all k ∈ N. For example, the signature of the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right) is well-formed, while the signature of the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (left) is not. We assume that signatures are represented using binary numbers, i.e., the encoding size of S , denoted by ||S ||, can be exponentially smaller than the number of nodes.
Before formulating our results about the patrolling problem in a fully connected environment, we need to explain one important conceptual contribution of this paper, which is the notion of a modular strategy and the associated compositionality principle. A defender's strategy σ is modular if σ(h) depends only on the length of h modulo some constant c (in particular, note that the current defender's position is irrelevant). For example, the two strategies of Fig. 1 are modular (the constant c is equal to 2 and 6 for the strategy on the left and on the right, respectively). Let G be a patrolling problem with a set of nodes U. For every U ′ ⊆ U, let G[U ′ ] be the patrolling problem obtained from G by restricting the set of nodes to U ′ and the set of transitions to E ∩ U ′ ×U ′ (note that this makes sense even if the environment of G is not fully connected). Let U 1 , . . . , U k ⊆ U, and let σ 1 , . . . , σ k be modular defender's strategies in G[U 1 ], . . . , G[U k ], respectively. For every probability distribution ν over {1, . . . , k}, we can construct the ν-composition of σ 1 , . . . , σ k , which is a modular defender's strategy
Note that σ is a correctly defined defender's strategy for G[U 1 ∪ · · · ∪ U k ] only if the environment of G contains all of the required transitions between the nodes of U 1 , . . . , U k (if the environment of G is fully connected, this is no issue). It follows immediately that val(σ) ≥ min{ν i · val(σ i ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} (as we shall see, this inequality can be strict). Thus, one can construct a defender's strategy for a given patrolling problem G by splitting the set of nodes into two or more subsets (not necessarily disjoint), solving the smaller instances recursively, and then computing a suitable convex combination of the solutions. As we shall see momentarily, this approach leads to an efficient algorithm capable of computing optimal (or suboptimal) strategies for very large patrolling problems in couple of seconds. Now we can explain our main results about the patrolling problem in a fully connected environment.
C. Given a patrolling problem G where T = U, we have that val ≤ k∈supp(S )
where S is the signature of G and supp(S ) is the set of all k ∈ N such that S (k) > 0. This bound is valid for an arbitrary environment E. D. There is an algorithm which inputs a signature S of a patrolling problem G with a fully connected environment (where T = U) and outputs a pair (θ, V) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
-The running time of the algorithm in polynomial in ||S ||.
-θ is a symbolic representation of a modular strategy for G, and V is a symbolic representation of val(θ). ) of a recursive system of polynomial equations that is also constructed by the algorithm. The number of variables k actually depends on the "Euclid complexity" of S and can be constant (or even zero) for arbitrarily large S . -If the signature S is well-formed, then k = 0 and the strategy θ is optimal. Since k = 0, no extra computational time is needed to calculate/approximate the parameters, and hence θ is "fully synthesized" in time polynomial in ||S ||. -If the signature S is not well-formed, then the strategy θ is a ν-composition of simpler modular strategies and the variables defined via the system of polynomial equations correspond to the weights used to combine these simpler strategies together. Further, we have that 
Given a patrolling problem G with T = U and a well-formed attack signature S , we say that the environment E of G is sufficiently connected if val is equal to the value of G in the fully connected environment. The problem whether E is sufficiently connected is NP-complete. Further, this problem is NP-complete even for a subclass of patrolling problems such that supp(S ) = {k}, where k ≥ 3 is a fixed constant. For a subclass of patrolling problems where supp(S ) = {2}, the problem is solvable in polynomial time.
Comments on C. Note that the presented upper bound on val does not depend on E. An obvious question is whether this bound is tight. That is, given a function S : N → N 0 such that supp(S ) is finite, we ask whether there exists a patrolling problem G with T = U such that the signature of G is S and
It follows from our results that the answer to this question is yes if S is well formed. This means that the bound can be potentially lowered (only) for those S that are not well formed.
As an example, consider the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (left). Here supp(S ) = {2} and S (2) = 3, and hence we obtain val ≤ 2/3. Since val = ( √ 5 − 1)/2 < 2/3, the bound is not tight. For the patrolling problem of Fig. 1 (right) we have that supp(S ) = {2, 3}, S (2) = 2, and S (3) = 3, which gives an upper bound (2/2 + 3/3) −1 = 1/2. Since val = 1/2, this bound is tight. Comments on D. The strategy θ is obtained by applying the "decomposition" technique described earlier.
Since we intend to produce a strategy synthesis algorithm whose running time is polynomial in ||S ||, we also need to design a special language allowing for compact representation of modular strategies in space polynomial in ||S || (see Section 2.4). First, we split the nodes of G into disjoint subsets according to their attack length. Then, we show how to compute a modular strategy for a set of n nodes with the same attack length d. Here, we use a decomposition technique which resembles Euclid's gcd algorithm. First we check whether d divides n. If so, we split the n nodes into pairwise disjoint sets U 0 , . . . , U d−1 so that |U i | = n/d for every 0 ≤ i < d, and define a modular strategy σ such that σ(h) selects uniformly among the elements of U i , where i = |h| mod d. Observe that val(σ) = d/n, which is optimal by C. If d does not divide n and n = k · d + c where 1 ≤ c < d, then we split the n nodes into two disjoint subsets U 1 and U 2 , where U 1 contains k · d nodes and U 2 contains c nodes. A strategy σ 1 for U 1 is constructed as above, and we need to process the set U 2 . If c divides d, the strategy σ 2 for U 2 is a simple loop over the nodes of U 2 . A closer look reveals that an appropriate distribution ν = (ν 1 , ν 2 ) for combining σ 1 and σ 2 should satisfy the equation ν 1 · val(σ 1 ) = 1 − ν modular strategy for defending n nodes with the same attack length d. If d divides n, then this strategy is provably optimal. In fact, we conjecture that the constructed strategy is always optimal, but we leave this hypothesis open (recently, it has been shown by Lamser [22] that the algorithm produces an optimal strategy for all odd n and d = 2). Further, let us note that the number of variables/equations in the constructed system of polynomial equations is bounded by a polynomial in ||S ||, but the size of S is not a good measure for identifying hard instances. What really matters is the number of "swaps" in the Euclid's algorithm applied to n and d; see Section 2.4 for further comments. After processing all subsets of nodes with the same attack length, we combine the resulting strategies using an appropriate distribution. The details are given in Section 2.4.
As an example, consider the patrolling problems of Fig. 1 . In the first case, we have 3 nodes with the same attack length 2. Since 2 does not divide 3, we split the set of nodes into U 1 = {u 0 , u 1 } and U 2 = {u 2 }. The strategy σ 1 for U 1 selects the node u 1 or u 0 with probability 1, depending on whether the length of the history is odd or even, respectively. Note that val(σ 1 ) = 1. For the set U 2 , we have that |U 2 | divides 2, and so the strategy σ 2 is a self-loop on u 2 . The appropriate distribution ν = (ν 1 , ν 2 ) for combining σ 1 and σ 2 should satisfy the equation
1 . Thus, we obtain that ν = κ = ( √ 5 − 1)/2, which yields the strategy of Fig. 1 (left). The strategy of Fig. 1 (right) is obtained by first splitting the set of nodes into U 1 = {t 0 , t 1 } and U 2 = {v 0 , v 1 , v 2 } according to their attack length, solving these subproblems (note that the solution for U i is a strategy which loops over the vertices of U i ), and then combining them with ν = (0.5, 0.5).
Comments on E. We show that for every patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d) with T = U and a well formed signature S , there exists a characteristic digraph M S depending only on S and computable in polynomial time, such that E is sufficiently connected if, and only if, (U, E) contains a subdigraph isomorphic (respecting the attack lengths) to M S . From this we immediately obtain that the problem whether a given E is sufficiently connected is in NP, and we also provide the matching lower bound. Note that the characteristic digraph can be used to synthesize a minimal sufficiently connected environment for solving a given patrolling problem.
Related work. Two player zero-sum stochastic games with both perfect and imperfect information have been studied very intensively in recent years (see, e.g., [11, 19, 18] ), also for games with infinite state-space [10, 16, 15, 2] . Patrolling games have so far been considered mainly in the context of operation research. Here, the emphasis is usually put on finding methods allowing to synthesize a sufficiently good defender's strategy, and the basic theoretical questions related to the underlying formal model are usually not studied in greater detail. The problem of finding locally optimal strategies for robotic patrolling units have been studied either in restricted environments (e.g., on circles in [3, 4] ), or fully-connected environments with weighted preference on the targets [6, 7] . Some novel aspects of the problem, such as variants with moving targets [9, 17] , multiple patrolling units [8] , or movement of the attacker on the graph [7] and reaction to alarms [23] have also been considered in recent works.
The results
We assume familiarity with the notions introduced earlier in Section 1.
The existence of an optimal defender's strategy
We start by proving that there exists an optimal strategy for the defender. This is a generalization of similar results recently achieved in [1] for a special type of patrolling games where all nodes share the same attack length (i.e., supp(S ) is a singleton). The proof technique is completely different.
Theorem 2.1. For every patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d), there exists an optimal defender's strategy.
Proof Sketch. We construct an optimal strategy σ * as a point-wise limit of a sequence σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . of strategies where each σ k is 1/k-optimal. More precisely, we select σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . in such a way that for each history h, the sequence of distributions σ 1 (h), σ 2 (h), . . . converges to a probability distribution, and we define σ * (h) to be its limit (we obtain σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . by starting with an arbitrary sequence of 1/k-optimal strategies and successively filtering subsequences that are convergent on individual histories). It is relatively straightforward to show that if val(σ * ) ≤ val − δ for some δ > 0, then for all k's large enough we have val(σ k ) ≤ val − δ/2, which contradicts the fact that each σ k is 1/k-optimal. For details see Appendix B.
Computing finite-memory ε-optimal strategies
In this subsection we describe a generic algorithm which for a given patrolling problem computes a finite representation of an ε-optimal strategy. Let us start with the definition of a finite-memory strategy. 
Theorem 2.3. Let ε > 0 and assume thatû ∈ T . There is an ε-optimal finite-memory defender's strategy computable in time
.
We construct our strategy using the so-called characteristics (some intuition is given below). Given a characteristic c, we use c r , c s , c c to denote the three components of c = (r, s, c), respectively. Intuitively, we interpret a given characteristic c as a "local" plan of defence for nextd steps where
• c r is the current node, • c s is the current assignment of probabilities to the successors of c r , and • for every 2 ≤ k ≤d and every u ∈ T , we interpret c c (k, u) as the probability of visiting u in at least one, and at most k steps from c r . 1 To simplify our notation, we denote by c c (1, u) the probability c s (u) for every u ∈ T . Now assume that the current plan is formalized by a characteristic c, and suppose that the defender makes one step to a next vertex v chosen randomly with probability c s (v). Now the defender declares a new plan, c v ∈ Char where c v r = v. However, the crucial observation is that the new plans (c v ) v∈U must be consistent with the original plan c in the following sense for all 2 ≤ k ≤d and all u ∈ T :
We say that such a vector (c v ) v∈U ∈ Char U of characteristics is a successor of c. Now let C be a finite set of characteristics such that every c ∈ C has a successor (c v ) v∈U ∈ C U (i.e., c v ∈ C for all v ∈ U), and there is at least oneĉ ∈ C such thatĉ r =û. We say that such C is closed. We construct a finite-memory strategy (M, N, m 0 , ξ) where M = C, N(c, v) = c v , m 0 =ĉ, and ξ(c) = c s . Intuitively, the strategy follows the plans in C and always proceeds to the next plan according to a fixed successor in C U . We prove that this strategy works consistently with the characteristics of C, i.e., whenever the current history is h and the current memory element is c, then, subsequently, the probability of reaching u in at least one, and at most k steps is equal to c s (k, u). Thus the value of the finite-memory strategy cannot be worse than min c∈C val(c).
So, the computation of a finite-memory strategy reduces to a computation of a finite closed set of characteristics. We show that one such set can be extracted from a carefully selected ε-optimal strategy. Given a defender's strategy σ, we denote by H(σ) the set of all histories that σ may follow with a positive probability. Given a strategy σ and a history h ∈ H(σ) , u) is the probability of reaching u in at least one, and at most k steps starting with the history h using σ. Now let σ * be an optimal strategy. The crucial observation (see also Proposition C.1 in Appendix C) is that for every h ∈ H(σ) it holds that val(c[σ * , h]) ≥ val. By appropriately rounding probabilities in σ * , we obtain an ε-optimal strategy σ ε such that for every history h and every u ∈ U : . Our algorithm computes a closed subset C of a (finite) set of appropriately rounded characteristics that maximizes min c∈C val(c). This is done by a simple iterative procedure which maintains a growing pool of characteristics (in order of decreasing value) and tries to find its closed subset. For details see Appendix C.
A bound on the Stackelberg value
Now we establish an upper bound on val which depends only on the attack signature S of G. The simplicity of the argument is due to Proposition D.1.
Theorem 2.5. For every patrolling problem
where S is the attack signature of G.
Proof Sketch. Intuitivelly, every node u has to be visited by the defender with propability at least val during each d(u) consecutive steps. Hence, summing the probabilities of visiting u in each of the steps from 1 to ℓ = Π k∈supp(S ) k we need to reach a value greater than or equal to val · ℓ/d(u). Summing these values for all nodes we have at least u∈U val · ℓ/d(u). Note that in each step we visit some node with probability one and so, the sum for all nodes and ℓ steps is just ℓ. This implies the theorem due to ℓ
Solving patrolling problems with a fully connected environment
Let G = (U, T,û, E, d) be a patrolling problem where T = U and E = U × U, and let S be the signature of G. Recall the notion of modular strategy and the associated decomposition principle introduced in Section 1. In particular, recall that a d-modular strategy σ for G is fully represented by probability distributions µ 0 , . . . , µ d−1 over U such that σ(h) = µ i where i = |h| mod d. We start by considering the case when G has n nodes with the same attack length d. Since we aim at developing a strategy synthesis algorithm polynomial in ||S ||, we need to invent a compact representation of modular strategies which is sufficiently expressive for our purposes. We assume that the nodes of U are indexed by numbers from 1 to |U|, and we use U i, N to denote the subset of U consisting of N subsequent nodes starting from i, i.e., all u ℓ where i ≤ ℓ < i + N and 1 ≤ i ≤ i + N − 1 ≤ |U|. Let us consider the class of expressions determined by the following abstract syntax equation:
is a modular strategy which splits U i, N into pairwise disjoint subsets of size M and then "walks around" these sets L times, θ 1 ; θ 2 is a modular strategy which "sequentially alternates" between θ 1 and θ 2 , and ν p [θ 1 , θ 2 ] is a strategy which "composes" θ 1 and θ 2 using the distribution (1 − α(p), α(p)). A detailed description of the semantics is given in Appendix E.
Our strategy synthesis algorithm is a recursive procedure Defend which inputs a triple (U i, N , D, e), where U i, N is the set of nodes to be defended, D is the number of steps available for defending U i, N , and e is an expression which represents the "weight" of the constructed defending strategy in the final distribution ν. The procedure outputs a pair (θ, V) where θ is an expression specifying a D-modular strategy for U i, N , and V is an arithmetic expression representing the guaranteed "coverage" of the targets in U i, N when using θ with the weight e. As a side effect, the function Defend may produce equations for the variables that are employed in symbolic strategy compositions of the form ν p [θ 1 , θ 2 ]. The algorithm is invoked by Defend (U 1, |U| , d, 1) , and the system of equations is initially empty. The recursion is stopped when D divides N or N divides D, and in these cases Defend provably produces strategies that achieve the best coverage for every value of e. In the other cases, Defend proceeds recursively by splitting either the set of nodes or the number of steps available to protect the nodes. In both cases, Defend tries to exploit the available resources in the best possible way. A full description is given in Appendix E. At the very end, we obtain a d-modular strategy σ for G specified by an expression θ whose size is polynomial in ||S ||, an expression V which represents val(σ), and we also obtain a system of polynomial equations for the variables which parameterize θ and V. The system has a unique solution in [0, 1] k (where k is the number of variables) that corresponds to the intended valuation. The size of k can be, for given n > d, computed as follows: we put n 0 = n and d 0 = d, and then n i+1 = n i mod d i and d i+1 = d i mod n i+1 . The number of variables for n and d is equal to the least index j such that d j divides n j . In particular, if d divides n, there is no variable at all, and our algorithm immediately produces a strategy which achieves the value d/n, which is optimal by Theorem 2.5. As an example of a "hard" instance, consider n = 709793170386861531 and d = 37248973638339152, which requires 30 variables and equations. The solution (producing val(σ) = 0.05247471678) can be computed by Maple in fractions of a second. It has been recently proved by Lamser [22] that our algorithm produces na optimal strategy also when d = 2 (for arbitrary n), which includes the example of Fig. 1 (left) . Since the algorithm seems to exploit the available resources optimally, we conjecture that it actually outputs an optimal strategy for all parameters.
To solve a patrolling problem with a general signature S , we simply split the nodes into disjoint subsets according to their attack lengths, solve these subproblems by the above algorithm, and then compose the modular strategies so that all nodes are defended equally well. One can easily check that if S is well formed, this leads to a strategy whose value matches the bound of Theorem 2.5. Thus, we obtain the following: Theorem 2.6. Let G be a patrolling problem with T = U, a fully connected environment, and a well formed signature S . Then there is an optimal modular strategy σ computable in time polynomial in ||S ||.
A characterization of sufficiently connected environments
For the rest of this subsection, we fix a patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d) with T = U and a well-formed signature S . We classify the conditions under which E is sufficiently connected (recall that E is sufficiently connected iff the value for G is the same as the value for G when E is replaced with the fully connected environment U × U. Let M S be a digraph with vertex labelling d constructed as follows:
• For all k ∈ supp(S ), i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, and j ∈ {1, . . . , S (k)/k}, we add a fresh vertex
• For every pair of vertices
Note that M S is computable in polynomial time. We prove the following:
Theorem 2.7. Let G = (U, T,û, E, d) be a patrolling problem such that T = U and the signature S of G is well formed. Then E is sufficiently connected iff (U, E) contains a subdigraph H which is d-preserving isomorphic to M s (i.e., if x of H is mapped to y of M S then d(x) = d(y)).
The "if" part of Theorem 2.7 is trivial, because if (U, E) contains a subdigraph M s , then we can implement the optimal modular strategy constructed by the algorithm of Subsection 2.4. The "only if" part is more challenging. The crucial observation is that the defender is not allowed to visit any target u twice within d(u) steps whenever she is aiming to reach the bound of Theorem 2.5. The underlying observations also reveals that every optimal strategy σ starts to behave like the strategy σ * after every history which visits all nodes. Hence, the strategy σ * does not belong to ∞ j=1 Σ j , except for some trivial cases (see Section 1). A proof of Theorem 2.7 is given in Appendix F. An immediate consequence of Theorem 2.7 is that the problem whether a environment E is sufficiently connected is in NP. We complement this by a matching lower bound in the following theorem with a full proof in Appendix G.
Theorem 2.8. The problem whether the environment of a given patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d)), such that T = U and the signature S of G is well formed, is sufficiently connected, is NP-complete. Further, this problem is NP-complete even for a subclass of patrolling problems such that supp(S ) = {k}, where k ≥ 3 is a fixed constant. For a subclass of patrolling problems where supp(S ) = {2}, the problem is solvable in polynomial time.

Open problems
Our proof of the existence of an optimal defender's strategy (Theorem 2.1) does not allow to conclude anything about the structure of optimal strategies. One is tempted to expect that optimal strategies are in some sense "regular" and require only finite-memory, but our present understanding does not allow to prove this conjecture. Another challenge it to lift the presented compositional technique to a more general class of patrolling games (such results would have a considerable practical impact). Finally, the question whether the algorithm of Section 2.4 produces an optimal strategy for all inputs is also interesting but left open.
A Detailed definitions for appendices
We use N and N 0 to denote the sets of positive and non-negative integers, respectively. The sets of all finite and infinite words over a given alphabet Γ are denoted by Γ * and Γ ω , respectively. We write ε for the empty word. The length of a given w ∈ Γ * ∪ Γ ω is denoted by |w|, where the length of an infinite word is ∞. We denote by Γ ≤k the set of all words w ∈ Γ * satisfying |w| ≤ k. The last letter of a finite non-empty word w is denoted by last(w). Given a (finite or infinite) word w over Γ, the individual letters of w are denoted by w 0 w 1 · · · . Given two words w, w ′ ∈ Γ * ∪ Γ ω we write w w ′ whenever w is a prefix of w ′ , i.e., whenever there exists a word w ′′ ∈ Γ * ∪ Γ ω such that w ′ = ww ′′ . Further, we write w ≺ w ′ whenever w w ′ and w w ′ .
Given a finite or countably infinite set A, a probability distribution over A is a function δ : A → [0, 1] such that a∈supp(δ) δ(a) = 1. The support of δ is the set supp(δ) = {a ∈ A | δ(a) 0}. We use ∆(A) to denote the set of all distributions over A. A distribution δ ∈ ∆(A) is positive if δ(a) > 0 for every a ∈ A, and rational if δ(a) is rational for every a ∈ A.
Definition A.1. A patrolling problem is a triple G = (U, T,û, E, d) where U is a finite set of nodes, T ⊆ U is a set of targets,û ∈ T is the initial target, E ⊆ U × U is an environment, and d : T → N assigns to each target the associated attack length. The attack signature of G is a function S : N → N 0 where S(k) is the cardinality of {u ∈
We use supp(S ) to denote the set {k ∈ N | S (k) 0}. We say that S is well formed if k divides S (k) for every k ∈ N. Byd we denote max u∈U {d(u)}.
Let G = (U, T,û, E, d) be a patrolling problem. We say that E is fully connected if E = U × U. Given a node u ∈ U, we denote by succ(u) the set {u ′ ∈ U | (u, u ′ ) ∈ E} of all successors of u. A path is a finite or infinite word w ∈ U * ∪ U ω such that (w i , w i+1 ) ∈ E for every 0 ≤ i < |w|. A history is a finite non-empty path, and a run is an infinite path. The sets of all histories and runs are denoted by H and R, respectively. Given a set of histories H ⊆ H, we use R(H) to denote the set of all runs ω such that w ω for some w ∈ H (when H = {h}, we write R(h) instead of R({h})).
Definition A.2. A defender's strategy is a function σ : H → ∆(U) such that supp(σ(h)) ⊆ succ(last(h)) for every h ∈ H. The set of all defender's strategies is denoted by Σ.
An attacker's strategy is a function π : H → T ∪ {⊥} such that whenever π(h) ⊥, then for all h ′ ≺ h we have that π(h ′ ) = ⊥. We denote by Π the set of all attacker's strategies.
Intuitively, given a history h, the defender chooses the next node randomly according to the distribution σ(h), and the attacker either attacks a node u ∈ T (π(h) = u), or waits (π(h) = ⊥). Note that the attacker can choose to attack only once during a play, and also note that he cannot randomize. This is because randomization does not help the attacker to decrease the Stackelberg value, and hence we can safely adopt this restriction from the very beginning.
For a given strategy σ ∈ Σ, we define the set H(σ) ⊆ H of relevant histories, consisting of all h ∈ H such that for all h ′ ∈ H and u ∈ U where h ′ u h we have that σ(h ′ )(u) > 0. Note that a defender's strategy σ determines a unique probability space over all infinite paths initiated in a given u ∈ U in the standard way (see, e.g., [12] ), and we use P σ u to denote the associated probability measure. Given an attacker's strategy π, we say that a run w contains a successful attack if there exist a finite prefix h of w and a node u ∈ T such that π(h) = u and u is not among the first d nodes visited by w after the prefix h. For every node u ∈ U, we use D u [π] to denote the set of all defended runs initiated in u that do not contain a successful attack. Hence,
is the probability of all runs initiated in u that are defended when the defender uses the strategy σ and the attacker uses the strategy π. We omit the subscript u in P σ At some places, we consider strategies obtained by "forgetting" some initial prefix of the history. Formally, for all h ∈ H and a strategy θ of the defender/attacker, we define a strategy θ h by θ h (uh ′ ) = θ(hh ′ ) for every u ∈ U and h ′ ∈ H. Note that σ h behaves similarly for all initial nodes. We are typically interested in its behavior starting in last(h), which corresponds to behavior of σ when started at h.
In what follows, we also use the notion of an immediate attack value. Given a defender's strategy σ, a history h ∈ H(σ), and a node u ∈ U, we define att-val h (σ, u) to be the probability of reaching u from last(h) in at least one and at most d(u) steps using the strategy σ h . Intuitively, att-val h (σ, u) is the probability of defending u assuming that the attack on u starts after the history h, i.e., π(h) = u. It is easy to see that
B The existence of an optimal defender's strategy Theorem 
For every patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d) there exists an optimal defender's strategy.
Proof. We construct an optimal strategy σ * as a point-wise limit of a sequence σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . of strategies where each σ k is 1/k-optimal. More precisely, we prove the following. Claim : There is a sequence of defender's strategies σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . and a defender's strategy σ * such that
• each σ i is 1/i-optimal, i.e., val(σ i ) ≥ val − 1/i, • for every h ∈ H(σ) and every u ∈ U we have that lim i→∞ σ i (h)(u) = σ * (h)(u). (In particular, the limit exists for every h and u.) Proof: Assume a lexicographical ordering on histories of H. To simplify our notation, we consider an "empty" history ǫ such that ǫ h for every h ∈ H. We consider histories h successively according to and inductively define sequences σ h,1 , σ h,2 , . . . of defender's strategies so that the following holds: A. each σ h,i is 1/i-optimal, B. σ h,1 , σ h,2 , . . . is a subsequence of all preceding sequences σ h ′ ,1 , σ h ′ ,2 , . . . for h ′ h, C. for every h ′ h the sequence of distributions σ h,1 (h ′ ), σ h,2 (h ′ ), . . . converges (point-wisely) to a probability distribution. Then it suffices to put σ i = σ h,|h| where h is the i-th history according to , and to define σ * (h) = lim i→∞ σ i (h).
We define σ h,i as follows:
• For every i ∈ N, we define σ ǫ,i to be an arbitrary 1/i-optimal strategy.
• Assume that σ h ′ ,1 , σ h ′ ,2 , . . . has already been defined for h ′ . Consider a next history h according to .
As the space of all probability distributions on U is compact, there exists a subsequence σ h,1 , σ h,2 , . . . of σ h ′ ,1 , σ h ′ ,2 , . . . such that σ h,i (h) converges (point-wisely) to a probability distribution on U. The sequences apparently satisfy the above conditions A, B, C. We prove that the defender's strategy σ * obtained in the above Claim is optimal. Suppose that σ * is not optimal, i.e. val(σ * ) ≤ val − δ for some δ > 0. Then there is an attacker's strategy π such that P σ * (D[π]) ≤ val − δ/2. For every i ∈ N, let π i behave as π on runs where π attacks before i-th step, and do not attack at all on the rest. Claim :
where p i is the probability that the the attacker starts his attack after i. Clearly, p i → ∞ as i → ∞, which proves the claim. Thus for a sufficiently large i we have that
because the transition probabilities determined by σ * and σ k on the first i +d steps are getting closer and closer with growing k. However, then we obtain that
, which means that σ k cannot be 1/k-optimal for large k.
Proposition B.2. Assume thatû is a target. There every optimal defender's strategy
Proof. Recall that we denote by val u and val u (σ) the values of G and of σ, resp., when u is used as the initial node instead ofû. It suffices to prove Proposition B.2 under the assumption that val = valû = max u∈T val u , because then we obtain, as a consequence, that val u = valû for all u ∈ T . Indeed, using σ * , every target node has to be visited. So given u ∈ T , there is a history h ∈ H(σ * ) such that u = last(h). However, note that (1) holds also for σ * h instead of σ * , and thus val u (σ * h ) ≥ val. As valû = val is maximal, we obtain that val u = valû.
So assume that val = valû = max u∈T val u . Let σ * be an optimal strategy. Note that val = max u∈T val u implies val last(h) (σ * h ) ≤ val for every history h ∈ H(σ) such that last(h) ∈ T . We obtain that val last(h) (σ h ) ≤ val for every history h ∈ H(σ) because even if last(h) is not a target, σ h starting in last(h) must visit a target almost surely and the attacker may wait until it happens.
We claim that σ * satisfies (1), i.e. that att-val h (σ * , u) ≥ val for all h ∈ H(σ * ) and all u ∈ T . Indeed, assume that att-val¯h(σ * , u) ≤ val − δ for some δ > 0 andh ∈ H(σ * ) and u ∈ U. Assume, w.l.o.g., that σ * follows the historyh with probability at least δ.
Note that due to val last(h) (σ * h ) ≤ val for every h, the deficiency of σ * ath cannot be compensated on other histories. We obtain the following: Let A be the set of all histories h ′ of length |h| (i.e., in particular,
This contradicts the fact that σ * is optimal.
C Computing finite-memory ε-optimal strategies C.1 Proposition C.1
Let us fix a patrolling problem G = (U, T,û, E, d).
Proposition C.1. Given ε > 0, there is an ε-optimal strategy σ ε such that for every history h and every
Proof. Let σ be an optimal strategy. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u |U| } be the set of nodes of G and define s = ⌈(|U|d)/ε⌉ −1 . For every history h and every 1 ≤ i ≤ |U|, we inductively define σ ε (h)(u i ) = k i · s, where k i is the largest number satisfying
This rounding procedure guarantees that σ ε (h) is indeed a probability distribution over U, i.e.
u∈U σ ε (h)(u) = 1 (note that simple rounding would not guarantee this property). Further, when we realize the invariant 0 ≤ i−1 j=1 (σ(h)(u j ) − σ ε (h)(u j )) < s holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |U|, it is easy to see that |σ(h)(u i ) − σ ε (h)(u i )| < s, which is captured by the following claim. Claim A: |σ(h)(u) − σ ε (h)(u)| < s for every u ∈ U.
It follows from the definition of σ ε that whenever σ(h)(u) = 0, then also σ ε (h)(u) = 0. This means that any history executable using σ ε is also executable using σ, i.e. H(σ ε ) ⊆ H(σ). Now, knowing that att-val h (σ) is defined if att-val h (σ ε ) is defined, we prove the following:
• The inequality (4) directly follows from Proposition B.2 as h ∈ H(σ).
• The inequality (3) clearly holds as forcing the attacker to attack immediately cannot decrease the value of the game.
• To prove the first inequality (2), we have to analyze the impact of the rounding in the definition of σ ε . Denote by R[ι, h, t, k] the probability of reaching t ∈ T from last(h), h ∈ H, in up to k steps using the strategy ι h .
We prove by induction on k that for all h ∈ H, t ∈ T , and k ∈ N we have that
The base case (k = 1) directly follows from Claim A for all u ∈ U and the fact that R[ι, h, t, 1] = ι(h)(t) for every defender's strategy ι.
Let us denote the difference R[σ, h, t, k]
= k|U|s . (6) is just an application of Claim A and of the formula ab
-The equality (5) follows from the definition of R[ι, h, t, k] as R[ι, h, t, k]
-The inequality (7) follows from Claim A and from the induction hypothesis.
-The inequality (8) holds because R[σ, hu, t, k − 1] ≤ 1 and u∈U {t} σ ε (h)(u) ≤ 1.
So we have that R[σ, h, t, d(t)]
and therefore
C.2 Formal proof of Theorem 2.3
In order to make lengthy computations more succinct, we use the following shorthand notation: Given a characteristic c = (r, s, c) ∈ Char, we define:
• c(0, u) = 1 if u = c r , and c(0, u) = 0 for all u c r .
• c(1, u) = c s (u) for all u ∈ U.
• c(k, u) = c c (k, u) for all 2 ≤ k ≤d and u ∈ T . Also, we use functional notation to denote vectors of characteristics (i.e. successors). That is we represent each (c v ) v∈U ∈ Char U as a function ζ : U → Char where ζ(v) = c v for every v ∈ U. Let us formally define the notion of successor of a characteristic. We say that ζ : U → Char is a successor of c ∈ Char if for every v ∈ U holds ζ(v)(0, v) = 1, and for every u ∈ T and 2 ≤ k ≤d holds
A set of characteristics B ⊆ C is closed if there is at least one c ∈ B satisfying c(0,û) = 1, and every c ∈ B has a successor ζ : U → B.
Given a defender's strategy σ and a history h, we denote by c[σ, h] the characteristic defined as follows: c[σ, h](last(h)) = 1, and c[σ, h](1, u)
= σ(h)(u) for every u ∈ U, and for every 2 ≤ k ≤d and u ∈ T we define 
which means that ξ is a successor of c [σ, h] .
Let C be a finite closed subset of Char. We say that a finite-memory strategy σ = (M, N, m 0 , ξ) is consistent with C if
is a successor of c.
Proposition C.3. Let C be a finite closed set of characteristics and assume that σ is consistent with C. Then val(σ) ≥ min c∈C val(c).
Proof. Let us first prove that c[σ, h] ∈ C for every history h ∈ H(σ). Let us fix a history h. We prove that c [σ, h] 
It is easy to show that N(ĉ, h)(0, last(h)) = 1. For k > 0 we proceed by induction on k. Immediately from definitions we obtain that for every
Here the second equality follows by induction, the last equality follows from the fact that K (N(ĉ, h) ) is a successor of N(ĉ, h). This proves that c[σ, h] ∈ C for every history h ∈ H(σ). Now since every defender's strategy σ satisfies
we obtain Given any closed subset C of Char ε satisfying min c∈C val(c) ≥ val − ε, we obtain, via Proposition C.3, a finite-memory ε-optimal strategy. So it remains to give an algorithm for computing such a closed subset C.
The Algorithm
The 
Correctness
In step 2., the algorithm computes the greatest closed subset of A using a straightforward iterative algorithm. As the characteristics are added to A in the order of non-decreasing value and there exists a closed subset C of Char ε satisfying min c∈C val(c) ≥ val − ε (due to Lemma C.4), a subset C ′ satisfying min c∈C ′ val(c) ≥ val − ε is computed when C ⊆ A for the first time.
Complexity
Let us denote by Θ the size of Char ε . It is straightforward to show that Θ ∈ |U|d ε O(|U|d 2 )
. Now the computation in step 2. b. takes time in Θ O(|U|) (for every characteristic of B one has to check all possible successors, i.e. vectors of the form ζ : U → B). The whole algorithm iterates at most Θ times through 1. -3. (a characteristic is added to A in every iteration except the last one). So the total complexity is at most
D A bound on the Stackelberg value
Using the arguments of the proof of Proposition B.2, the following proposition can be shown. 
Note that Proposition D.1 cannot be generalized to non-optimal strategies, i.e., for a given non-optimal σ and h ∈ H(σ) we do not necessarily have that val last(h) (σ h ) = val(σ) (a counterexample is easy to find).
Theorem 2.5. For every patrolling problem
Proof. Let σ be an optimal defender's strategy. For all h ∈ H(σ) and i ∈ N 0 , let Node h,i : R(h) → U be a function which to every run hw ∈ R(h) assigns the node w i . Further, let µ h,i ∈ ∆(U) be a distribution defined by µ h,i (u) = P σ (Node h,i =u)/P σ (R(h)). First, we show that for all u ∈ U and i ∈ N 0 we have that
Let us fix some u ∈ U and i ∈ N 0 , and let H i (σ) be the set of all h ∈ H(σ) such that |h| = i. For every h ∈ H i (σ), consider an attacker's strategy π such that π(h) = u. Due to Proposition D.1, we have that val last(h) (σ h ) = val, which means that
Now we can continue with the main proof. Let ℓ = Π k∈supp(S ) k. Since
µû , j (u) ≥ val for all u ∈ U and i ∈ N 0 (see above), we immediately obtain
as desired.
E Solving patrolling problems with a fully connected environment
Let G = (U, Tû, E, d) be a patrolling problem where T = U, E = U × U, and let S be the signature of G. We start by defining the semantics for the "strategy expressions" introduced in Section 2.4 precisely.
• • 
. Now we give a detailed description of the algorithm of Section 2.4. We construct a recursive function Defend which inputs a triple (U i, N , D, e) , where U i, N is the set of nodes to be defended, D is the number of steps available for defending U i, N , and e is an expression which represents the "weight" of the constructed defending strategy in the final distribution ν. The procedure outputs a pair (θ, V) where θ is an expression specifying a D-modular strategy for U i, N , and V is an arithmetic expression representing the guaranteed "coverage" of the targets in U i, N when using θ with the weight e. As a side effect, the function Defend may produce equations for the employed variables. The algorithm is invoked by Defend (U 1, |U| , d, 1) , and the system of equations is initially empty. A call Defend (U i, N , D, e) is processed as follows: 
The set of equations is enriched by V 1 = V 2 . That is, we require that p is chosen so that the nodes of This is perhaps the most subtle part of our algorithm. Here we do not split the set U i, N , but the number of steps available to protect U i, N . Intuitively, the constructed strategy θ first tries to loop over the targets of U i, N as long as possible (i.e., for the first k · N steps). This is what θ 1 does. Then, θ tries to exploit the remaining c steps in the best possible way, i.e., by employing θ 2 . That is, we put θ = θ 1 ; θ 2 . If the weight of θ is e, then the targets of U i, N are protected with probability at least V = 1 − (1 − V 1 )(1 − V 2 ). The function returns the pair (θ, V).
F The existence of a characteristic subdigraph
In this section we prove the non-trivial direction of Theorem 2.7, i.e., we show that if G = (U, T,û, E, d) is a patrolling problem with T = U, a well formed attack signature S , and a sufficiently connected environment, then M S is (d-preserving isomorphic to) a subdigraph of (U, E). Let us assume that E is sufficiently connected, and let σ be a defender's strategy for G such that val(σ) = k∈supp(S )
. Due to Theorem 2.5, we obtain that σ is optimal, i.e., val = val(σ), and hence we can apply Proposition D.1 to σ.
We reuse the notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 2.5. In particular, for all h ∈ H(σ) and i ∈ N 0 , we use Node h,i : R(h) → U to denote a function which to every run hw ∈ R(h) assigns the node w i . Further, we use µ h,i ∈ ∆(U) to denote a distribution defined by µ h,i (u) = P σ (Node h,i =u)/P σ (R(h)). We start by realizing the following: Proof. Due to Lemma F.6, there exist hh ′ ∈ H(σ) and hh ′′ ∈ H(σ) such that |h ′ | = ℓ, |h ′′ | = ℓ + 1, last(h ′ ) = u, and last(h ′′ ) = u ′ . By Lemma F.4, we obtain σ(hh ′ )(u ′ ) = val, which means (u, u ′ ) ∈ E. 
G Complexity of finding the characteristic subdigraph
In this section we prove two claims leading to combined Theorem 2.8 via Theorem 2.7. We will focus on a subclass of patrolling problems G = (U, T,û, E, d) such that T = U, supp(S ) = {k}. In such a case, for a well-formed attack signature S , we have that |U| = n is divisible by k and that the characteristic digraph M s has a particularly nice description: M s has a node set u 0 , . . . u n−1 and u i u j is an arc iff j = (i + 1) mod k.
Our proofs will actually be expressed in terms of a special equitable k-colouring of the complementary digraph H = (U, E ) of the environment E (i.e., H having precisely those arcs, but not the loops, which are absent in E): Let |U| = |V(H)| = a · k. The task is to find a colouring c : V(H) → {1, 2, . . . , k} of the node set such that (a) |c −1 (i)| = a for each i = 1, . . . , k, and (b) no arc xy of H receives colours c(x) = j, c(y) = ( j mod k) + 1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k} (while both x, y might receive the same colour). Comparing this with the definition of M s one immediately concludes that (U, E) contains a subdigraph isomorphic to M s if, and only if, the complement H has a special equitable k-colouring.
